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1  | INTRODUC TION
Dolly the sheep is probably the most famous sheep in the world, and 
she is rightly so as she was the first mammal produced via cloning. In 
cloning the nucleus of a somatic cell is transferred into an enucleated 
oocyte (i.e. an oocyte whose nucleus has been previously removed), 
and then it is activated by external means. If everything goes accord‐
ing to plan the cell will begin to divide, the embryo will be transferred 
into a womb (under the appropriate biological conditions) and then, 
after some time, an ‘nearly identical genetic copy’ of the individual 
who provided the somatic cell (i.e. the nuclear DNA provider) will be 
born.1 I say a nearly identical genetic copy because whereas the to‐
tality of the nuclear DNA would come from the nuclear DNA pro‐
vider, the zygote’s mitochondrial DNA would most certainly not come 
from said nuclear DNA provider, or the provider’s maternal line. This 
is the case as in mammals mitochondria are matrilineally transmit‐
ted.2 For the clone to be an identical genetic copy, sensu stricto, of 
the nuclear DNA provider the latter, or someone from their maternal 
line, should also provide the would‐be enucleated egg that in turn 
contains the mitochondria.
After the birth of Dolly scientists around the world started to try to 
clone other mammals, and up to this date cats, coyotes, camels, dogs, 
1 Wilmut,	I.,	Beaujean,	N.,	de	Sousa,	P.	A.,	Dinnyes,	A.,	King,	T.	J.,	Paterson,	L.	A.	…	Young,	
L.	E.	(2002).	Somatic	cell	nuclear	transfer.	Nature, 419(6907), 583–587.
2 It	is	very	uncommon	for	paternal	mitochondria	to	be	incorporated	into	the	zygote.	Luo,	S.,	
Valencia,	C.	A.,	Zhang,	J.,	Lee,	N.	C.,	Slone,	J.,	Gui,	B.,	…	Huang,	T.	(2018).	Biparental	
inheritance of mitochondrial DNA in humans. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 
of the United States of America. 115(51),	13039–13044;	Schwartz,	M.,	&	Vissing,	J.	(2002).	
Paternal	inheritance	of	mitochondrial	DNA.	New England Journal of Medicine, 347(8), 576–580.
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Abstract
In	a	recent	publication	Tom	Douglas	and	Katrien	Devolder	have	proposed	a	new	ac‐
count	 of	 genetic	 parenthood,	 building	 on	 the	work	 of	Heidi	Mertes.	Douglas	 and	
Devolder’s account aims to solve, among other things, the question of who are the 
genetic parents of an individual created through somatic cell nuclear transfer (i.e. 
cloning): (a) the nuclear DNA provider or (b) the progenitors of the nuclear DNA pro‐
vider.	Such	a	question	cannot	be	answered	by	simply	appealing	to	the	folk	account	of	
genetic parenthood, according to which the genetic parents of an individual are those 
individuals who produced the egg and sperm, respectively, which fused to create the 
embryo. It cannot be so as in cloning there is no fertilization as such. In this article 
I critically examine Douglas and Devolder’s new account of genetic parenthood and 
demonstrate that it is vulnerable to counterexamples that exploit the lack of a condi‐
tion specifying that genetic parents should cause a child’s coming into existence.
K E Y W O R D S
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goats, horses, mice, monkeys, pigs, rabbits and rats have already been 
cloned. Furthermore, one consequence of Dolly’s birth was that people 
got even more interested in the question of whether human beings 
could be cloned, and if so whether it would be morally permissible to do 
so.3	Broadly	speaking,	two	positions	emerged.	On	the	one	had	there	are	
those who argue that it would be immoral to clone human beings, and 
on the other hand there are those who argue that under certain circum‐
stances it would be morally permissible to do so. An example of the 
former	is	Leon	Kass:	‘Mass‐scale	cloning	of	the	same	individual	makes	
the point vividly; but the violation of human equality, freedom, and dig‐
nity is present even in a single planned clone’.4 An example of the latter 
is	Carson	Strong,	who	argued	that	in	certain	circumstances	it	would	be	
ethical for infertile couples to resort to cloning, as a way of having kin 
that were genetically related to one of them.5
One issue that becomes patent when we reflect on the possibly 
of employing human cloning for ‘reproductive purposes’ is that clon‐
ing does not fit our folk conception of genetic parenthood. According 
to this folk conception, the person who provided the egg and the 
person who provided the sperm, which fused and created an em‐
bryo, are the genetic parents of the created embryo. Cloning is prob‐
lematic because in it no sperm and egg fuse, and thus the question of 
who are the genetic parents of any given clone arise: (a) the person 
who provided the nuclear DNA, or (b) the progenitors of the person 
who	provided	the	nuclear	DNA.	Interestingly,	Leon	Kass	noticed	that	
reproductive cloning complicated our traditional understanding of 
human reproduction: ‘Asexual reproduction, which produces “sin‐
gle‐parent” offspring, is a radical departure from the natural human 
way, confounding all normal understandings of father, mother, sib‐
ling, grandparent, etc., and all moral relations tied thereto.’6
In	a	recent	publication	Tom	Douglas	and	Katrien	Devolder	have	
proposed a new account of genetic parenthood. Their account, 
which	builds	on	the	work	of	Heidi	Mertes,7 aims to solve the ques‐
tion of who are the genetic parents of an individual created through 
cloning. They defend the view that the progenitors of the nuclear 
DNA provider are the clone’s genetic parents. In this article I criti‐
cally examine Douglas and Devolder’s new account of genetic par‐
enthood. Firstly, I show that Douglas and Devolder draw an incorrect 
conclusion when they apply their new account of genetic parent‐
hood to answer the question of whether an egg donor is a genetic 
parent, in cases where the egg used in the reproductive procedure 
has been enucleated (e.g. maternal spindle transfer, cloning). 
Secondly,	I	demonstrate	their	account	is	vulnerable	to	counterexam‐
ples that exploit the absence of a condition specifying that genetic 
parents should cause the child’s coming into existence.
The article proceeds as follows. In the second section I briefly 
present and explain why previous accounts of genetic parenthood 
are flawed. In the third section I present Douglas and Devolder’s 
new account of genetic parenthood and show that they draw the 
wrong conclusion when faced with cases where an egg has been 
enucleated for a reproductive purpose. In the fourth, and final, sec‐
tion I present a case that shows that their account of genetic parent‐
hood is found wanting.
2  | ACCOUNTS OF GENETIC 
REPRODUC TION
In this section I review the accounts of genetic parenthood that 
Heidi	Mertes	 investigated	 in	 her	 article	 ‘Gamete	 Derivation	 from	
Stem	Cells:	Revisiting	the	Concept	of	Genetic	Parenthood’;	and	ex‐
plain	why	they	are	found	wanting.	I	begin	with	Mertes,	as	Douglas	
and Devolder do likewise. The first account that she presents can be 
named the informational account of genetic parenthood:
[A] child is my genetic child when it has 50% of my DNA 
or when it has 23 of my chromosomes. This 50% over‐
lap of genetic material is, for example, what is looked 
into when performing a paternity or maternity test.8
There are several problems with this account, as it focuses on in‐
formation overlap. Foremost, under it my siblings would be my genetic 
parents and vice versa. This would be the case as I share 50% of the 
information contained in my genetic nuclear material with my siblings. 
Furthermore, it can also be the case that I share 50% of my nuclear DNA, 
in the informational sense, with someone who is not a close relative of 
mine, and that would entail that she is my genetic child or parent.
A	more	promising	 account,	which	Mertes	discusses	 and	which	
was	 first	 presented	 by	 Avery	 Kolers,9 can be named the Direct 
Derivation	Account	of	genetic	parenthood:	‘X	is	a	genetic	child	of	Y	
if	X	is	directly	derived	from	Y’s	genes’.10
The direct derivation condition rules out the possibility of my sib‐
lings being my genetic parents, as I was not directly derived from 
them,	and	vice	versa.	As	Kolers	asserts:	‘[d]erivation	is	fundamentally	
a causal relationship; the offspring is as it is because of its relationship 
to its parents, whereas the inverse is not true’.11	Mertes	contends	that	
the problem with this account is that it leads to counterintuitive con‐
clusions when we examine two reproductive cloning cases.12	Let	us,	
following Douglas and Devolder, call the first case the Cloned Child:
3 Devolder,	K.	(2017).	Cloning.	In	Zalta,	E.	N.	(Ed.).	The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. 
Stanford,	CA:	Stanford	University.	https	://plato.stanf	ord.edu/entri	es/cloni	ng/
4 Kass,	L.	R.	(1998).	The	wisdom	of	repugnance:	Why	we	should	ban	the	cloning	of	
humans. Valparaiso University Law Review, 32(2), 697.
5 Strong,	C.	(1998).	Cloning	and	infertility.	Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 7(3), 
279–293.
6 Kass,	op.	cit.,	note	4,	p.	690.
7 Mertes,	H.	(2014).	Gamete	derivation	from	stem	cells:	Revisiting	the	concept	of	genetic	
parenthood. Journal of Medical Ethics, 40(11), 744–447.
8 Ibid,	p.	744.
9 Kolers,	A.	(2003).	Cloning	and	genetic	parenthood.	Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare 
Ethics, 12(4), 401–410.
10 Mertes,	op.	cit.,	note	7,	p.	744.
11 Kolers,	op.	cit.,	note	9,	p.	402.
12 In	what	follows	I	will	bracket	the	question	whether	the	egg	donor,	for	the	cloning	
procedure, is a genetic parent under the Direct Derivation Account. I do so as I will 
expand on this issue later on.
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[A]	 couple	 (Mr	 and	 Mrs	 X)	 may	 become	 infertile	
after already having conceived one genetically re‐
lated	child	(Y).	As	they	long	for	a	second	child,	they	
opt	 to	clone	 their	existing	child	Y,	which	 results	 in	
the birth of Z.13
According	to	the	Direct	Derivation	Account,	Mr	and	Mrs	X	are 
not the genetic parents of Z. They are not so as Z was not directly 
derived	from	their	genes.	On	the	other	hand,	Y	is the genetic par‐
ent	of	Z,	as	Z	was	directly	derived	from	Y’s	genes.	Nevertheless,	
according	to	Mertes,	in	this	scenario	‘it	is	most	likely	that	Mr	and	
Mrs	X	will	“feel”	like	the	genetic	parents	of	Z,	whereas	Y	is	unlikely	
to	think	of	herself	as	Z’s	mother.’	Let	us	now	consider	the	second	
case	that	Mertes	presents,	that	I	will	call	Cloned	Parent,	also	fol‐
lowing	Douglas	and	Devolder:	‘Mr	and	Mrs	X	decide	to	clone	Mr	X	
instead	of	Y,	resulting	in	child	Q.’14
According	to	the	Direct	Derivation	Account,	Mr	X	is	the	only ge‐
netic	parent	of	Q.	He	is	so	as	Q’s	genes	were	directly	derived	only	
from	Mr	X.	Now,	Mertes	notices	 that	 in	 this	case	 the nuclear DNA 
provider and the clone
do not share 50% of DNA, but 100%. The people who 
would	pass	 [in	Cloned	Parent]	a	maternity/paternity	
test	would	be	the	genetic	parents	of	Mr	X.	In	this	sec‐
ond	scenario,	both	Mr	X	and	his	parents	might	con‐
sider	 themselves	 as	 Q’s	 genetic	 parents	 and	 both	
would have good arguments (either a contribution of 
50% DNA or direct derivation) to support their 
claim.15
The	 overall	 issue	 here,	 according	 to	Mertes,	 is	 that	we	 have	
contradictory intuitions on similar cloning scenarios. On the one 
hand, in Cloned Child we seem to support the idea that the pro‐
genitors of the nuclear DNA provider are the genetic parents of the 
clone.	But	on	the	other	hand,	in	Cloned	Parent	we	seem	to	support	
the idea that the nuclear DNA provider is the genetic parent of the 
clone. Of course, holding both statements as true at the same time 
is contradictory.
After	presenting	these	two	cloning	cases	Mertes	does	not	bite	
the	bullet	and	accept	that,	 in	Cloned	Child,	Z’s	genetic	parent	 is	Y.	
And she also does not try to revise the Direct Derivation Account in 
order	to	solve	this	purported	contradiction	 in	our	 intuitions.	What	
she does is assert that these two cases show that ‘[t]here is no fixed, 
scientific, everlasting criterion of genetic parenthood that everyone 
can agree upon’ and that ‘the term genetic parenthood is not value‐
free, but dependent on personal intuitions, intentions or judge‐
ments’.16	 Let	 us	 now	move	 to	Douglas	 and	Devolder’s	 account	 of	
genetic parenthood.
3  | THE MODIFIED DIREC T 
PROPORTIONATE GENETIC DESCENT 
ACCOUNT
Douglas	and	Devolder	contend	that	Mertes’s	conclusion	about	ge‐
netic parenthood is premature, in the sense that she has not shown 
that genetic parenthood is ‘a subjective concept that depends on 
the views of people about what sorts of genetic relation matter’.17 
Rather than falling for this subjectivist account of genetic parent‐
hood they propose a new account, one that can deal with the Cloned 
Child	and	the	Cloned	Parent	cases.	But	importantly,	their	account	is	
intended to be one ‘that captures the concept of genetic parent‐
hood implicit in everyday usage’.18	 Before	 engaging	with	Douglas	
and Devolder’s account, it is important to notice that they do not 
start	from	Mertes’s	presentation	of	the	Direct	Derivation	Account,	
but rather from a revised	version	of	it:	‘Direct	Genetic	Descent:	P	is	
C’s	genetic	parent	if	and	only	if	(a)	C’s	genes	derived	from	P’s	genes,	
and (b) not through deriving from the genes of some third, interven‐
ing	individual,	M.’19
They start from this revised version in order to avoid a possible 
counterexample:
Suppose	a	sperm	from	P1	 is	used	to	fertilize	an	egg	
from	P2.	The	 resulting	 zygote	 then	has	 its	DNA	 re‐
moved and replaced by DNA from some other individ‐
ual T. This zygote is then carried to term and eventually 
a child, C, is born. There is a sense in which C derives 
directly	 from	 P1	 and	 P2’s	 genes;	 those	 genes	 gov‐
erned the development of gametes, which created a 
zygote	from	which	C	developed.	But	C’s	genes	do	not	
derive	 from	P1	 and	 P2’s	 genes,	 they	 derive	 instead	
from	T’s	 genes,	 and	 this	 surely	 prevents	 P1	 and	 P2	
from qualifying as C’s genetic parents.20
Douglas	and	Devolder’s	Direct	Genetic	Descent,	which	is	a	revised	
version	 of	Mertes’s	 presentation	 of	 the	 Direct	 Derivation	 Account,	
runs into the same issues mentioned above when we consider the 
Cloned	Parent	and	Cloned	Child	cases.	Now,	Douglas	and	Devolder	
offer	a	refined	version	of	Direct	Genetic	Descent,	which	seems	to	an‐
swer the question of who are the clone’s genetic parents, while at the 
same time maintaining the concept of genetic parenthood implicit in 
everyday usage:
Direct	Gametic	Genetic	Descent:	P	is	C’s	genetic	par‐
ent	if	and	only	if	(a)	C’s	genes	derived	from	P’s	genes,	
(b)	 through	 a	 gamete	 produced	 by	 P,	 and	 (c)	 not	
13 Mertes,	op.	cit.,	note	7,	p.	745.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Douglas,	T.,	&	Devolder,	K.	(2018).	A	conception	of	genetic	parenthood.	Bioethics, 
33(1), 54–59, p. 4.
18 Ibid,	p.	1.
19 Ibid,	p.	3.
20 Ibid.
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through deriving from the genes of some third, inter‐
vening	individual,	M.21
Douglas and Devolder here introduce the condition that the ge‐
netic derivation must be via a gamete produced by the intending ge‐
netic parent. Thus it follows from this account that the nuclear DNA 
provider, in cloning cases where the enucleated egg does not come 
from said nuclear DNA provider, is not a genetic parent of the clone. 
In such cases he or she is not a genetic parent as the clone was not 
derived	 from	one	of	 their	 gametes.	 In	Cloned	Child,	Y,	who	 is	 the	
nuclear DNA provider, is not the genetic parent of clone Z. And in 
Cloned	Parent,	Mr	X,	who	 is	 the	nuclear	DNA	provider,	 is	not	 the	
genetic	parent	of	Q.
Douglas and Devolder also conclude, following the Direct 
Gametic	Genetic	Descent	account,	that	in	cases	where	we	employ	a	
mitochondrial replacement technique the egg donor is not a genetic 
parent	of	 the	 created	 child.	Direct	Gametic	Genetic	Descent	 ‘also	
allows	us	to	evade	the	conclusion	that	P3	(the	mitochondrial	donor)	
is the genetic parent of C4 (the mitochondrial recipient) in 
Mitochondrial	Donation.’22	Let	us	remember	that,	broadly	speaking,	
mitochondrial replacement techniques are those where the nuclear 
DNA of the intending mother (or intending parents) is transferred 
from an egg (or zygote) with deleterious mitochondrial DNA muta‐
tions, to an enucleated egg (or zygote) that possesses healthy mito‐
chondria.23 It is also relevant to bear in mind that mitochondrial DNA 
corresponds to, roughly, 0.1% of the whole DNA content of the 
human organism.
Douglas and Devolder are mistaken in their application of Direct 
Gametic	Genetic	Descent	to	mitochondrial	replacement	techniques	
cases. In such an account the egg donor for a mitochondrial replace‐
ment technique is a genetic parent.	Why?	Because	the	child’s	mito‐
chondrial genes were derived from the egg donor’s genes (Douglas 
and Devolder does not specify if there is a minimum of genes that 
must be transmitted for someone to classify as a genetic parent), 
from a gamete produced by the egg donor, and not by deriving such 
genes from the mitochondrial genes of some third, intervening indi‐
vidual,	M.	And	the	same	rationale	would	apply	to	the	egg	donor	in	
cases of reproductive cloning: she would be a genetic parent of the 
clone, regardless of the fact if she is also the nuclear DNA provider.
Now,	 Douglas	 and	 Devolder	 assert	 that	 from	 Direct	 Gametic	
Genetic	Descent	it	follows	that	neither	of	the	clones	(i.e.	Q	and	Z)	
has	genetic	parents:	Direct	Gametic	Genetic	Descent	 ‘implies	 that	
the	clones	created	in	Cloned	Child	and	Cloned	Parent	lack	any	ge‐
netic parents, since their genomes were not inherited via gametes’.24 
Stricto sensu Douglas and Devolder are incorrect. The clones created 
in	Cloned	Child	and	Cloned	Parent	have	at	least	one	genetic	parent:	
the egg donor.
Bracketing	the	previous	issue	regarding	egg	donors,	Douglas	and	
Devolder	assert	that	Direct	Gametic	Genetic	Descent	is	not	only	prob‐
lematic because the clones would not have genetic parents, which 
they	do.	They	contend	that	Direct	Gametic	Genetic	Descent	is	flawed	
because there are other cases that are ‘closer to those of normal 
human reproduction’ that also create problems for such an account. As 
a point in case, imagine that the following is possible: we enucleate a 
zygote, and we replace its nuclear material with the genetic material 
obtained	from	two	somatic	cells	taken	from	individuals	A	and	B.	In	this	
case each individual contributes 50% of the nuclear DNA material.25 If 
this were ever to happen then, under direct gametic genetic descent, 
we would have to accept that any resulting child from this biotechnol‐
ogy,	let	us	call	it	(following	Douglas	and	Devolder)	Two‐Donor	Genome	
Transplantation,	would	not	have	genetic	parents.	Yet	it	seems	that	in	
this	case	A	and	B	would	be	the	genetic	parents.
In	 order	 to	 solve	 the	 problem	 posed	 by	 Two‐Donor	 Genome	
Transplantation, Douglas and Devolder propose to replace the con‐
dition of genetic inheritance via gametes with a condition of genetic 
inheritance of some determined proportion from parent to child. 
They	call	their	new	account	Direct	Proportionate	Genetic	Descent:
P	is	C’s	genetic	parent	if	and	only	if	(a)	some	propor‐
tion	X	of	C’s	genes	derived	from	P’s	genes	and	(b)	not	
through deriving from the genes of some third, inter‐
vening	individual,	M.26
If	proportion	X,	which	they	do	not	specify,	were	to	be	<100%	of	
the nuclear DNA, then under this account the nuclear DNA provider is 
not	the	clone’s	genetic	parent.	And	if	proportion	X	were	to	be	>	0.1%	of 
the whole DNA then the egg donor, in cases where we employ maternal 
spindle transfer, for example, would not be a genetic parent. Now, the 
upshot	of	 the	Direct	Proportionate	Genetic	Descent	account	 is	 that	
it	does	not	entail	 the	absurd	conclusion	that	 in	Two‐Donor	Genome	
Transplantation the resulting child has no genetic parents. According to 
this	account	A	and	B	would	be	the	child’s	genetic	parents.	This	would	
be the case if the proportion of genetic material established by this 
account	(i.e.	X)	is	set	to	include	the	proportion	that	obtains	in	cases	of	
sexual reproduction.
Even	though	Direct	Proportionate	Genetic	Descent	can	accom‐
modate certain counterexamples, Douglas and Devolder maintain 
that	according	to	it	the	clones	created	in	Cloned	Parent	and	Cloned	
Child still do not have genetic parents:
However,	Direct	Proportionate	Genetic	Descent	 re‐
mains too stringent in the cases of Cloned Child and 
Cloned	 Parent,	 for	 it	 continues	 to	 imply	 that	 the	
clones produced in these cases have no genetic par‐
ents	–	 an	 implication	 that	Mertes	 and	Sparrow	 find	
implausible.27
21 Ibid,	p.	4.
22 Ibid.
23 Palacios‐González,	C.	(2017).	Ethics	of	mitochondrial	replacement	techniques:	A	
Habermasian	perspective.	Bioethics. 31(1), 27–36.
24 Douglas	&	Devolder,	op.	cit.,	note	17,	p.	5.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
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It is important to note that this conclusion does not necessarily 
follow	from	their	account.	 It	does	not	do	so	as	proportion	X	could	
be a proportion of genetic material in the range between 50% and 
100%. The fact that the nuclear DNA provider passes ‘too much’ 
of her genetic material does not rule her out from being a genetic 
parent in principle. Regardless of how we solve the previous point, 
under	Direct	Proportionate	Genetic	Descent	the	genetic parents of 
the	nuclear	DNA	provider	(i.e.	the	parents	of	Mr	X	and	Y)	cannot	be	
regarded	as	the	genetic	parents	of	the	clone	(i.e.	Q	and	Z);	as	in	such	
cases they – the genetic parents of the nuclear DNA provider – are 
the ‘third intervening individual’.
Douglas and Devolder contend that it is possible to revisit the 
conditions	established	in	Direct	Proportionate	Genetic	Descent	and	
soften them, so we arrive at an account of genetic parenthood that 
does	not	conclude	that	in	Cloned	Parent	and	Cloned	Child	the	clones	
do not have genetic parents. In the previous paragraph I have shown 
that this ‘softening’ is not necessary, but adopting such solution 
would entail abandoning the concept of human genetic parenthood 
implicit in everyday usage. The way in which Douglas and Devolder 
weaken	Direct	Proportionate	Genetic	Descent	is	by	abandoning the 
idea that there cannot be a third intervening individual. Now they 
accept that in some instances there can be a third individual involved 
in	the	reproductive	endeavour.	But,	interestingly,	this	third	individ‐
ual is not a genetic parent, but what can be described as a bridge be‐
tween progenitors and descendants. For example, in Cloned Child 
case they ‘propose that the intervening individual (C1) does not break 
the genetic parenthood relation	[between	P1	and	P2,	and	C2]	in	this	
case because she passes on too much of her genetic information to 
C2 [emphasis added]’.28 Douglas and Devolder formalize their re‐
vised account as follows:
Modified Direct Proportionate Genetic Descent:	P	is	C’s	
genetic parent if and only if (a) some proportion	X	of	
C’s	genes	derived	from	P’s	genes	and	(b)	not	through	
deriving from the genes of some third, intervening in‐
dividual	 M	 from whom C derived proportion Y of his 
genes.29
Douglas and Devolder accept that ‘the proportion of genes’ will 
most probably not be a set figure but rather a range, and that this 
range	could	have	fuzzy	boundaries.	Before	I	show	why	this	account	
of genetic parenthood is found wanting, it is relevant to mention that 
according to it egg donors, both for cloning and mitochondrial re‐
placement procedures, are not in principle ruled out as genetic par‐
ents.	Why?	Because,	as	stated	above,	the	authors	do	not	specify	the	
proportion of genes that must be transmitted for someone to clas‐
sify	as	a	genetic	parent.	If	the	proportion	were	≥	0.1%	of	the	whole	
DNA content of the human organism then the egg donor would be 
the genetic parent of the resulting child. This would be so as the mi‐
tochondrial genes of any resulting child would have been derived 
from the egg donor’s genes, and not at all through some third inter‐
vening	individual	M.30
4  | THE C A SE AGAINST THE MODIFIED 
DIREC T PROPORTIONATE GENETIC 
DESCENT ACCOUNT
Even	if	Douglas	and	Devolder’s	account	avoids	what	they	consider	to	
be	a	counterintuitive	conclusion	(i.e.	that	Mr	X	is	Q’s	genetic	parent,	
and	that	Y	is	Z’s	genetic	parent),	they	run	into	a	more	severe	problem	
for not having a causation condition built into their account. In order 
to appreciate this issue consider the following case, which I will call 
‘Genome	Editing	’.	Alfred	and	Betty	want	to	have	a	child.	They	have	
been unsuccessful in achieving their goal through sexual intercourse, 
as	 both	 of	 Betty’s	 fallopian	 tubes	 are	 completely	 blocked.	 Alfred	
and	 Betty	 decide	 to	 resort	 to	 Charles,	 a	 fertility	 expert.	 Charles	
prescribes	 Betty	 some	 fertility	 drugs	 and	 then	 proceeds	 to	 surgi‐
cally retrieve her eggs. Once the eggs have been retrieved he uses 
Alfred’s sperm in order to carry out in vitro fertilization, and zygote 
E	is	produced.	After	the	IVF	procedure	Charles	does	not	transfer	the	
zygote	back	to	Betty,	but	rather	he	lets	it	grow	in	his	lab	for	3	days.	
On	the	fourth	day	Charles	uses	a	Genome	Editing	technique	in	order	
to	modify	E’s	cells.	 In	 this	case	he	 inserts	10%	of	his	own	nuclear	
genes	 into	E’s	cells.	Finally,	Charles	transfers	the	genetically	modi‐
fied	embryo	to	Betty,	and	after	some	months	E	is	born.
According	 to	 Modified	 Direct	 Proportionate	 Genetic	 Descent	
both	Alfred	and	Betty	are	E’s	genetic	parents,	if	‘proportion	X’	is	set	
to include a range between 5% and 50% of the total nuclear ma‐
terial.	 They	 are	 so	 in	 that	 45%	 of	 E’s	 nuclear	 genes	were	 derived	
from each one of them, and not through deriving from the genes 
of some third intervening individual. The question to answer now is 
whether	Charle,	the	fertility	doctor,	is	E’s	genetic	parent.	When	E	is	
first created Charles is not his genetic parent, as he does not satisfy 
condition	(a).	But,	Charles	becomes E’s genetic parent per means of a 
Genome	Editing	technology	when	E	is	4	days	old. This is the case as 
10%	of	E’s	genes	were	derived	from	Charles’	genes,	and	not	through	
deriving them from the genes of some third intervening individual.
The fact that Charles becomes	 E’s	 genetic	 parent	 shows	 that	
there	 is	 something	 wrong	 with	 Modified	 Direct	 Proportionate	
Genetic	Descent.	The	problem	is	that	this	account	allows	for	an	adult	
to become the genetic parent of an already existing individual; and this 
cuts against one of the necessary conditions of genetic parenthood: 
that one is one of the material causes of an individual coming into 
existence. Adopting a stance that maintains that such a causation 
condition is not necessary entails a radical revisionism of the con‐
cept of genetic parenthood, a revisionist position that needs to be 
defended.
At this point someone could present two objections to my 
Genome	Editing	case.	First,	 they	could	argue	 that	given	that	early	
embryos can twin they are not individuals, in the sense of being 
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid. 30 I	thank	an	anonymous	reviewer	for	bringing	this	point	to	my	attention.
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unified	 biological	 organisms,	 and	 thus	 Genome	 Editing	 does	 not	
show that such an account is found wanting.31 There are three ways 
in which I can address this objection. Firstly, I could show that early 
embryos are in fact individuals, but I do not have enough space to 
defend	such	a	view	(see	Mathew	Liao	(2010)	for	a	defence	of	such	
position).32	 Secondly,	my	 case	 could	 just	 be	 recast	 as	 referring	 to	
embryos that have passed the point where twining is possible. Third, 
Genome	Editing	works	in	non‐embryonic	cases	as	well.	Imagine	that	
rather	 than	 being	 a	 3‐day	 old	 embryo,	 E	 is	 a	 1‐year	 old	 baby.	 If	
Charles	were	to	edit	his	genome,	at	that	point,	so	that	now	10%	of	E’s	
genome	derived	from	Charles	then	Charles,	again,	would	become	E’s	
genetic parent, but this is absurd.
The	second	objection	holds	that	in	Genome	Editing	it	is	not	the	
case that Charles becomes the genetic parent of an already existing 
individual,	 this	 is	not	so	because	replacing	10%	of	E’s	genes	would	
destroy	E	and	create	a	new	individual	F.33	In	other	words,	E’s	numer‐
ical identity would not survive the extent of such procedure. If this 
were so then Charles would be the genetic parent of the recently cre‐
ated individual F, in as much as 10% of F’s genes derived from Charles’ 
genes and not through deriving them from some third intervening 
individual.	 According	 to	 this	 objection	 Genome	 Editing	 does	 not	
even get off the ground.
In order to respond to this objection the first thing I need to do is 
provide	an	account	of	what	an	organism	is.	According	to	Liao,	a	being	
X	is	essentially	an	organism	if
a)	X	begins	to	exist	when	the	capacity	to	regulate	and	
coordinate metabolic and other life processes is there; 
b)	X	persists	 as	 long	as	 there	 is	what	may	be	called	
‘organismic continuity,’ which is the continuing ability 
to regulate and coordinate metabolic and other life 
processes;	and	c)	X	ceases	to	exist	when	the	capacity	
to regulate and coordinate metabolic and other life 
processes is permanently gone.34
Now, it could be the case that all our DNA is necessarily required 
for the capacity to regulate and coordinate metabolic and life pro‐
cesses to be there; and thus, if some of it were to be replaced by 
similar DNA, but from a different origin, then the original capacity to 
regulate and coordinate would be destroyed and a new capacity 
would	be	created.	Even	when	it	is	intuitively	appealing	the	former	is	
incorrect. According to recent research 75% of our DNA is non‐cod‐
ing DNA.35	This	means	that	Charles	could	edit	10%	of	E’s	non‐coding	
DNA,	 and	 this	 would	 not	 affect	 E’s	 capacity	 to	 regulate	 and	
coordinate	metabolic	and	life	processes	thus,	also,	not	affecting	E’s	
numerical identity. Furthermore, my response to this second objec‐
tion holds true even if it were to be the case that the findings of the 
Encyclopedia	of	DNA	Elements	project,	which	were	able	to	assign	
biochemical functions to 80% of the genome, were true.36	Let	me	
finish	 by	 saying	 that	 Genome	 Editing	 shows	 that	 Douglas	 and	
Devolder’s	Modified	Direct	Proportionate	Genetic	Descent	account	
of genetic parenthood is presently found wanting, and that they 
need to do more work in order for it to be a plausible account of ge‐
netic parenthood.
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